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Democracy Under One-Party Rule?
A Fresh Look at Direct Village and Township Elections in the PRC
Gunter Schubert
1 The democratisation of  the  PRC’s  political  system continues  to  be  one of  the  most
important  issues  in  contemporary  China-watching  and  research1.  Although  the
empirical findings urge us to be very careful in predicting a democratic transition any
time soon, most experts seem to be optimistic—at least—when discussing the long-term
consequences  of  the  Chinese  reform  process:  Economic  development,  social
stratification,  political  decentralisation,  the rise  of  social  movements,  world market
integration,  the  influence  of  the  Internet  and,  last  but  not  least,  China’s  quest  for
international  respect  are  all  considered  factors  that  contribute  to  the  demise  of
authoritarian one-party rule.  Certainly enough,  these China scholars usually do not
dare to develop scenarios of regime transformation in the PRC2, since this depends on a
whole set of variables and interlinkage effects that cannot be seriously pre-calculated.
However, there still seems to be a common understanding that in the end the PRC will
not  be  able  to  withstand  the  victory  of  liberalism  and  democracy.  Consequently,
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is mainly regarded as a poor ideology that can
never constitute an alternative path to (or even be an alternative model of) modernity
as the Communist leadership is suggesting. In spite of much analytical fine-tuning in
the  China  field  over  the  past  decade, liberal  democracy  is  still  the  epistemological
benchmark of most Western research on political system reform in the PRC that even
those scholars tending to be sceptical or even pessimist on the short and medium-term
perspectives for Chinese democracy3 cannot do without. To put it in less provocative or
‘teleological terms’: No China scholar can think of long-term stability in China without
a comprehensive horizontal and vertical democratisation of the PRC’s political system
and the end of Communist one-party rule.4
2 In much Western research,5 China’s reform policies are conceived of as a gigantic repair
project  in  order  to  correct  the  mistakes  and  aberrations  of  Maoism.  This  is
accompanied by the implicit viewpoint that the PRC’s political system and society are
structurally  instable  and  prone  to  crisis,  because  the  Communist  regime  sticks
uncompromisingly to one-party rule.6 For example, China scholars in the West agree
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that  the Peking government’s  attempt to establish a  system of  law to protect  each
citizen’s  constitutional  rights—although  going  in  the  right  direction—is  doomed  to
failure, as long as the Communist Party (CP) claims the final say on right or wrong for
itself.7 Although progress in the codification and application of laws is not ignored,
most China scholars in the West dismiss these reform endeavours and demand true
‘rule of law’ in China. At the same time, however, they turn away from the interesting
question—to  what  degree  the  CP  actually  has  gained  new  and  rather  sustainable
legitimacy by the introduction of ‘rule by law’ only. As a matter of fact, the question of
sustainable legitimacy-building through institutional adaptiveness and flexibility of the
Party has hardly been broached in the China field.
3 The same critique can be directed at other political reforms that are often dismissed as
‘disguised authoritarianism’. The latter is certainly true for the mainstream verdict on
direct village elections in the PRC, which have only recently gained more scholarly
attention  (see  below).  This  said,  I  want  to  formulate  three  hypotheses:  1.  Village
elections  do  contribute  substantially  to  the  rise  of  democratic  politics  in  China;  2.
Direct elections at  the local  level—possibly extended to the townships and counties
soon—do  not  necessarily  challenge  Communist  one-party  rule;  and  3.  Local  direct
elections will generate new legitimacy for the Communist Party and stabilise the whole
political system instead of debilitating it. Therefore, the CP’s power monopoly can and
will be sustained for a long time yet.
4 Directly attached to the three hypotheses listed above is the assumption that we need a
change of perspective in the China field to understand the functioning and the stability
of  the  PRC’s  political  system better.  Too much is  lost  sight  of  or  is  perceived in  a
distorted way, if the noticeable change of the PRC’s political system is understood as an
incremental  and  unavoidable  transition  from  authoritarianism  to  (more  or  less)
Western-style  democracy.  Maybe  we  are  facing  here  the  gradual  evolution  of  a
relatively stable multi-level system that binds together some essential elements of the
Western model of competitive democracy with one-party rule. Tensions and frictions in
such a system would not be proof of systemic instability, but of internal negotiation
processes that actually strengthen the whole setting.
5 This also means that we must not measure the ‘democratic substance’ and stability of
the PRC’s political system against any ideal type (Idealtypus) of (Western) democratic
theory but by carefully analysing the internal innovation potentials of this system—i.e.
its  institutional  flexibility  and  adaptability―to  generate  elite  accountability  and
regime legitimacy. ‘Chinese Democracy’ in this restricted sense might be defined as fair
and competitive elections at the local level embedded in a system of one-party rule
which  is  generally  accepted  by  the  people.  Such  a  concept  does  not  ignore  the
possibility  of  overall  regime transformation (set  out  in  Western concepts  of  liberal
democracy) some time in the future. However, it assumes that democratic participation in
the PRC at the lower administrative levels is possible without automatically putting the
CP’s power monopoly into jeopardy,  but even stabilising it.  How sustainable such a
system is, depends on the CP’s ability to use its ‘gained time’ to proceed successfully
with the implementation of economic and social reforms. However,  as long as local
elections are democratic in the above-defined sense, the CP may gain enough time for
implementing those  reforms.  The following sections  draw on the  empirical  data  of
direct  village  and  township  elections  gathered  so  far  in  an  attempt  to  verify  this
assumption.
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Village elections
6 Since the passing of the experimental Organic Law of Village Committees in 1987, free
and direct  elections of  village committees have a firm legal  foundation in the PRC.
According to the Organic Law, these institutions administer all  public affairs in the
villages,  provide  public  welfare,  engage  in  dispute  settlement,  take  care  of  public
security and transmit villagers’ opinions, demands and proposals to the government.
Moreover, village committees implement government policies and regulations, most
importantly the fulfilment of grain delivery quotas, the promotion of local economic
development on the basis  of  the rural  household responsibility  system, and official
birth-planning.  Each village  committee  consists  of  three  to  seven members,  among
them a village director and a deputy, who are elected every three years. 
7 The  Organic  Law  was  highly  contested  within  the  CP  from  the  very  beginning  of
discussion about it in the mid-1980s. Its opponents—among them many local cadres—
were afraid of a dangerous politicisation of China’s villages and a further decline of
party control over the countryside. At the same time, the supporters of the law pointed
at the necessity to strengthen village self-rule and autonomy in order to promote rural
development  and  to  reconsolidate  the  shattered  party  legitimacy  at  the  grassroots
level. According to them, only if peasants gained a right to directly participate in local
politics,  could cadre corruption be reduced,  the peasant-Party relationship restored
and rural stability upheld. Finally, these forces landed a victory. In the following years,
the  Party  leadership  took  a  wait-and-see  approach,  with  warning  voices  never
disappearing from the scene.8 Ten years after its promulgation, the Organic Law was
evaluated by the Fifteenth Party Congress in September 1997. In November 1998, the
National People’s Congress passed a revised version.9 Since then, direct village elections
have been compulsory nation-wide.
8 According to information from officials of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), direct
elections  for  village  committees  have taken place  in  China’s  approximately  900,000
villages at least once since implementation began in the late 1980s.10 Some provinces
like Zhejiang, Fujian and Hebei, which started very early with elections, have already
seen several rounds of balloting. Others like Guangdong and Yunnan have started only
recently  to  experiment  with  direct  elections  at  the  village  level.  The  case  studies
presented by China scholars so far (comprising only a sample of some hundred villages
though)  tell  very  different  success  stories  of  this  government  reform  policy.  As  a
matter of fact, success is a very ambivalent notion here, as far as the CP’s perspective is
concerned. In some areas, where local cadres have illegally interfered in the election
process (e.g. by violating nomination regulations, imposing candidates or manipulating
election  results),  the  Party  often  gets  into  trouble:  At  best  peasants,  become
discouraged about taking part in the ballot. Sometimes, however, they start to engage
in local protests with devastating consequences for the Party’s legitimacy. But also in
those places, where elections have been implemented fairly well, things can turn out
badly for the Party. Since the peasants feel empowered by the right to vote, they are
ready  to  claim  better  implementation  of  the  Organic  Law  and  more  political
participation  after  the  elections.  In  both  cases,  the Party’s  core  aims  to  enhance
government efficiency and to stabilise its rule seem to be compromised considerably.
Indeed, by promoting direct elections, the Party might have installed a Trojan horse in
the villages, setting free forces that could soon shake the very foundations of the CP
regime. However, there are also signs that the government has succeeded in achieving
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more efficiency and legitimacy in other parts of rural China. Summarising the main
findings of empirical research on Chinese village elections, the following picture can be
drawn:11
• The procedural quality of direct village elections in the PRC has seen remarkable
improvements during the past decade. Many provinces have passed new implementation
guidelines since the revision of the Organic Law in 1998, covering issues such as free
nomination of candidates, secret voting and transparent ballot counting. They also have
given villagers the right to recall elected cadres in case of criminal acts while in office and
put under punishment any violations of the Organic Law.12 Furthermore, the national
standardisation of these guidelines is pushed forward by bureaucratic networking among
the different units of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Meanwhile, China scholars have found a
significant relationship between the quality of elections on the one hand and the degree of
political awareness of the peasants on the other: The better elections are implemented, the
stronger the inclination to participate in them. Although China lacks any tradition of
institutionalised democracy, it apparently follows the rule that competitivity and fairness of
elections enhance the will to participate.13
• At least in some parts of China, the introduction of direct elections has gradually changed
the relationship between the peasants and their village committees. Elected cadres need the
support of the villagers to stay in office. At the same time, democratically elected village
committees are equipped with new political legitimacy that they can use either for carrying
through the policy directives coming from above or for the formation of resistance against
the township and county governments on behalf of their electorate. Therefore, the position
of the village committees has become quite complex, although according to the Organic Law
they are still under the guidance of the Party. How the village committee is making use of
this position and how this is changing local power configurations is one of the most
intriguing issues of the empirical research currently being undertaken in China. Apparently,
in some places the village committees have become more resistant to the township
government, while in others conflicts between these two levels could be reduced. 14
• At the same time, the village Party secretary may lose his former authority as the dominant
factor in local politics. He now faces a democratically-elected village director who might
challenge him on the grounds of representing the people’s true interests. This forces the
Party to bind its nomination of village secretaries to some form of public endorsement. In
fact, the Party experiments with different methods to gain the villagers’ consent here. For
example, a so-called ‘two-ballot-system’ has been introduced in some parts of China
allowing all villagers a recommendation vote for the post of Party secretary.15 Only if the
Party’s candidate gains a majority of the vote, is he/she given the final okay to assume
office. In most cases, only those candidates promoted as Party secretaries have already won
the ballot for head of the village committee. Then the Party can take advantage of the village
director’s democratic legitimacy and is able to avoid a power conflict between the Party and
civilian branches of local government. Some scholars have stated that this specific
adaptation to a changed political environment in the villages might trigger a process of
intra-party democratisation that would have positive consequences for the further
development of local democracy in China. Although such a statement might be far too
optimistic, it is observable that the Party is trying to secure its power monopoly by
gradually introducing more transparency and democratic procedures to intra-party
decision-making concerning the recruitment of local office-holders.16
• Political participation has made the peasants more inclined to ‘contact’ their village
committees after the elections in order to make the committees fight for their personal or
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collective interests. Therefore, elections have sharpened political awareness in the
countryside. This is proven by a new culture of ‘rightful resistance’ vis-à-vis the cadre
bureaucracy: Peasants know their rights and are ready to claim them against those local
officials, who oppose direct elections and the containment of Party authority in rural China.
Petitions, demonstrations and sit-ins, but also violence are well-chosen strategies of ‘rightful
resisters’ to secure fair elections and rules-based cadre behaviour. If necessary, their
criticism and complaints are pushed up to the national level. This may suggest that peasants
have developed a rudimentary civic conscience. It is only rudimentary, because they do not
claim a general right of participation derived from the state Constitution, but insist only on
those limited rights that have been given to them at the lowest administrative level.
However, by doing this they implicitly insist on a contractual relationship between the Party
and the peasants. Therefore, ‘rightful resistance’ has both strengthened and shaken the
stability of Communist rule in the countryside—depending on the way the Party has reacted
to the resisters. 17
9 As was already emphasised, these are only provisional results that are certainly not
representative of every Chinese village. There can hardly be a doubt of the fact that in
the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  villages  with  direct  elections  the  Party  clearly
dominates the political process. Moreover, reports on serious conflicts between elected
village  committees  on  the  one  hand  and  village  Party  secretaries  and  township
governments on the other paralysing the village administration are abundant. The core
problem here is who has the final decision-making power.18 The Organic Law is rather
ambivalent on this issue: On the one hand, the Party is leading the village committee, on
the other hand it has to adhere to the principle of village self-rule and autonomy.19
Apart from this, elections are frequently rigged by powerful Party secretaries who are
supported by township governments to win the post of village committee director for
themselves  or  to  install  an  obedient  follower  of  party  and  township  government
directives. The problematic influence of clan organisations and powerful local networks
of cadres and entrepreneurs engaging in vote-buying and technical manipulations of
elections also belong to the everyday picture of direct village elections in China.20
10 However, much speaks for the hypothesis that all depends on time and practice: The
more often elections take place in a village, the more competitive and fair they tend to
be—and  the  more  politically  aware  and  active  become  the  peasants.  Since  the  CP
decided  at  its  Fifteenth  Party  Congress  in  1997  to  proceed  with  the  nationwide
institutionalisation  of  direct  village  elections,  there  is  quite  some  reason  to  be
optimistic  about  the  positive  development  of  this  reform  policy.  The  general
assessment  of  direct  village  elections  is  also  positive  for  many  cadres  supporting
Communist one-party rule. Obviously, many Party leaders and local officials see them
as conducive  to  rural  stability  and legitimacy-building.  This  might  also  explain the
Party  leadership’s  long  tolerance  of  those  provincial  and  local  cadres  who  started
experimenting  with  direct  township  elections  as  early  as  1998  (see  below).  This
tolerance seemed to run out with CP Central Committee Document No. 12 passed in
mid-2001, which stated clearly that direct elections of township governments do not
accord with the PRC Constitution and the Organic Law on Local People’s Congresses and
Local  Governments.  Since  then,  there  has  been  obvious  regression  in  terms  of
democratic  practice  in  those  places  where local  authorities  started direct  township
elections in the late 1990s. In other townships, plans to introduce such elections have
been frozen for the time being. However, this has not changed the determination of
Democracy Under One-Party Rule?
China Perspectives, 46 | march-april 2003
5
local  governments and Party branches in many provinces to prepare for the direct
ballot  and  to  try  it  out  at  the  appropriate  time.  How  do  we  interpret  this
phenomenon―and what may be its consequences for Communist rule in China in the
long term?
Township elections
11 As already pointed out, the leadership of the CP has tolerated experiments with direct
township  elections  in various  parts  of  the  country,  although  these  elections  are
officially considered unconstitutional and seem to have come to a halt since the passing
of Party Document No. 12 in mid-2001, mentioned above. The townships21 stand at the
lowest level of government with the system of people’s congresses. According to the
PRC Constitution, it is the members of the township people’s congresses who elect the
respective  township  governments.  By  introducing  direct  elections,  however,  the
township people’s congress is circumvented.22 Also, by electing their township heads,
the rural population gets additional leverage—at least theoretically—to fight back the
CP’s influence in local politics. This raises the question as to why the provincial and
local branches have actually become a motor of the direct ballot at this level in some
parts of China.
12 As a matter of fact, the reasons are the same as in the case of the introduction of direct
village elections in the late  1980s:  enhancement of  administrative efficiency by the
recruitment  of  new  functional  elites;  stabilisation  of  the  political  system  by  more
political  participation;  and consequently,  reconsolidation of  Party  legitimacy in  the
countryside.23 However, the township ballot is also a reaction to a structural problem
that has been caused by the consequences of direct village elections in recent years.
Today, many township governments face a politicised peasantry that is resisting the
policies coming down from this level, especially with respect to taxation and off-the-
record fees. In many cases, the peasants force their elected village committees to take
the lead in these confrontations. Also, township cadres find it more difficult these days
to interfere in the villages’ administration, for instance by influencing the nomination
of village committee candidates before elections or by exerting pressure on the village
committees thereafter. At the same time, the township governments themselves feel
the pressure coming down from the county governments, as they have to comply with
the policy guidelines handed down from this level. This pressure is strengthened by a
high degree of township fiscal dependence on the counties, inducing the townships to
fight for a bigger share of the village financial cake in order to gain more economic
autonomy  vis-à-vis  the  counties.  Consequently,  the  township  governments  become
‘sandwiched’ between the villages and the counties, which undermines their authority.
24 The introduction of direct township elections is seen by many township cadres and
local Party officials as the only way out of this situation.25
13 This development makes many observers believe that the same pressure will soon be
felt at the county level, too, so that in the end direct elections have to be introduced
successively at the county, provincial and, finally, national level. From that perspective,
starting direct village elections has sown the seeds for a gradual breach of the CP’s
power monopoly,  ending up in full-scale parliamentary democracy. The question is,
however, if this teleology grasps what is happening in the Chinese countryside today.
Do we really face the beginning of a democratisation process from the ‘bottom-up’ in
those places where direct elections have become genuinely meaningful? At this point, a
closer  look has  to  be given to  the CP’s  endeavours  to  counter  the danger of  being
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marginalised in those elections. As a matter of fact, the Party is not ready to give up its
political supremacy in the process at all, but tries to have a direct ballot without losing
control over it. Contrary to the ‘functional optimists’ and much Fukuyaman-Hegelian
historical thinking, I argue here that these endeavours are rather successful so far. The
CP’s cautious approach of implementing (or tolerating) direct elections and more intra-
Party accountability may indeed help it to generate enough legitimacy for proceeding
with one-party rule for a long time to come―especially if  the Party manages to go
ahead with economic reforms successfully at the same time.
14 How have direct township elections been implemented so far? The following is a brief
account of the most important developments since the beginning of this experiment in
the  late  1990s:  It  all  started  in  Nancheng township  of  Qingshen county  in  Sichuan
province, where provincial authorities had encouraged lower level Party branches to
experiment  with  direct  township  elections  since  early  1998.26 Preparations  for  this
move were kept completely secret. Candidates running for the two posts of township
head and deputy head were nominated by the haixuan method27 in late November 1998.
The Nancheng Party committee and the county organisation department then screened
those candidates down to three (out of eight) for the post of township head and another
eight (out of 22) for the position of deputy head. These nominees made brief speeches
in a primary school to village cadres and villager representatives of Nancheng township
who were asked to tell the villagers about the selected nominees and their respective
agendas afterwards. On November 28th, a primary election was held among the eligible
population in Nancheng, producing two final candidates for the post of township head
and another four candidates for deputy head. The final vote took place one week later,
on  December  5th.  No  public  campaigning  was  allowed  in  the  meantime.  This  was
indeed  the  first  direct  election  of  a  township  head  in  the  PRC.  Its  results  were
confirmed by the township people’s congress immediately after the election. The whole
process became public only in early 2001.
15 Almost at the same time as the Nancheng ballot gained steam, the Party committee of
Shizhong  district  in  Suining  municipality,  also  Sichuan  province,  also  started  to
implement direct township elections.28 Shizhong’s leaders first adopted a method of
‘public recommendation and selection’ (gongtui gongxuan), which had been promoted by
the CP organisation committee of Sichuan province in order to enhance the quality of
cadre recruitment. Starting in Baoshi town of Shizhong district in mid-1998, candidates
were nominated by the haixuan method (or nominated themselves) before undergoing
screening  by  a  civil  service-type  examination.  Only  two  out  of  69  candidates  were
disqualified from the election of township head during this process.  Thereafter,  the
remaining 67 candidates had to face a selectorate of all town congress deputies, village
Party  secretaries,  village  committee  directors  and village  small  group leaders,  who
chose the official candidates by a secret and openly counted ballot. Encouraged by the
positive  response  to  the  open  selection  process  in  Baoshi  town  by  the  provincial
authorities, Shizhong leaders then went on to conduct two open selections of Party
secretaries  in  Dongchan  town  and  Lianhua  town  and  another  open  selection  of
township head candidates in Hengshan town. These experiences paved the way for the
famous Buyun ballot in late 1998 (see below) 29.
16 Besides the ‘public recommendation and selection’ method applied in Nancheng, other
procedures  have  been  introduced  to  make  township  elections  more  democratic  in
recent years. In Zhuoli township of Linyi county, Shanxi province, a public opinion poll
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was conducted in April 1999 to grade the three official candidates for township head,
deputy head and township Party secretary. Each of them had to gain an approval rating
of at least 60% (the threshold was later lowered to 50%) to sustain the candidacy. One
day before the poll, the candidates―all incumbents―had to present work reports to a
selectorate of village and township administration and Party officials, representatives
of village committees and villagers. This meeting was transmitted to the township’s
villages by the county TV station. After the results of the poll had been announced, the
township  people’s  congress  officially  elected  the  successful  incumbents  into  office
again 30.
17 In the townships of Sunzhao and Fogesi of Xincai county in Henan province, candidates
for township head and deputy were nominated by the eligible population through the
haixuan method in early 2000. These nominees then underwent screening by the Party
committee of Xincai county, which reduced the number of candidates to seven and
eight  respectively.  Campaign  speeches  were  delivered  to  a  selectorate  of  villager
representatives that chose three official candidates for both posts in each township by
a  recommendation  vote.  As  in  the  case  of  Zhuoli,  the  people’s  congresses  of  both
townships then elected the new office-holders 31.
18 Quite different was the procedure chosen in Dapeng township of Longgang district in
Shenzhen. In January 1999, the authorities organised a ‘recommendation vote’ (tuijian
toupiao)  to  produce  preliminary  candidates  for  township  head.  All  nominees,  who
achieved  more  than  100  votes  (six  altogether,  of  whom  one  was  later  disqualified
because he was more than 50 years old) entered the second round, which was a hearing
before a selectorate of 1,068 party and township officials and villager representatives—
about one-fifth of all eligible voters in the township.32 After campaign speeches were
delivered by the five nominees, the selectors cast a vote of public assessment (minyi
ceping piao) to determine the final candidates. The winning candidate was then chosen
by the Election Committee to be presented to the township people’s congress for formal
election (xuanju piao).33
19 International  attention  on  China’s  experiment  with  direct  township  elections  was
raised  by  the  above-mentioned  first  direct  township  election  in  Buyun,  a  small
township of 16,000 residents, in December 1998. Candidates had to gather 30 signatures
of  eligible township residents to ensure their  nomination.34 A limited primary then
winnowed down the number of contenders to 15. Thereafter, a selectorate of 162 village
and township officials35 called the ‘Joint  Electoral  District  Conference’  (xuanju  lianxi
huiyi) chose two of the running 15 candidates by secret ballot. These two candidates,
none of whom enjoyed township backing, had to compete in direct elections held on
December 31st, after a week of campaigning and public questioning. They were joined
by a nominee of the Buyun Party Committee, who could join the final round directly on
the basis of a special clause in the election guidelines issued by the district authorities.
This candidate, Tan Xiaoqiu, was deputy Party secretary of Buyun township at the time.
He won the election by a very narrow margin of 50.19% over his two opponents.36 A
couple of days later, on January 4th, 1999, Tan was confirmed by the Buyun township
people’s congress by a simple show of hands. Of course one could have argued that the
nomination of Tan Xiaoqiu was unfair and undemocratic, since he did not have to stand
in the primary. However, he might have lost the direct ballot had he had to run in the
primary―but he did not. 37 
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20 Three years later, a new election for township head was due in Buyun. The township
people’s  congress deputies supported another direct  ballot  whereas a report jointly
issued in November 2001 by the Shizhong district people’s congress and the Buyun TPC
stipulated that the final candidates should be presented to the TPC for election. Anyone
fulfilling  the  qualifying  conditions  of  age,  education,  ‘upright  behaviour’  and  local
residency could join the primary which produced 14 candidates (of whom two were
screened  out  for  formal  reasons  and  two  withdrew  voluntarily).  A  ‘Joint  Electoral
District  Conference’,  this  time  consisting  of  165  village  and  township  officials  and
representatives, chose two final candidates by secret ballot, one of them the incumbent
township  head  Tan  Xiaoqiu.  On  the  last  day  of  December  2001,  the  second  direct
election for  Buyun township took off  and was won by Tan Xiaoqiu.  The result  was
confirmed by the Buyun TPC some weeks later, when it officially elected Tan Xiaoqiu to
the position of township magistrate38 
21 All  the  examples  mentioned here  show that  the  responsible  Party  branches  at  the
township  or  district/county  level  have  installed  important  ‘security  mechanisms’
within all township election procedures. In no case was there an unconditioned and
immediate direct ballot of a township head or government. Each election was ‘filtered’
through a screening process of a selectorate controlled by the Party which had the final
say  on those  candidates  who would  later  be  qualified  to  run in  the  direct  ballot.39
Obviously, it was important for the Party to bring its own preferences in accordance
with the democratic vote of the people as far as possible. This was achieved by different
procedural combinations of indirect and direct elements of democracy with the Party
mostly being in the lead. However, all information gathered so far suggests that the
township elections held under these new schemes are considered much fairer and more
democratic by the population than the constitutional  arrangement of  local  people’s
congresses40 electing the township governments. This shifts the attention back to my
central assumption that these limited elections (in Western terms) generate substantial
legitimacy for the Party and give it ‘breathing space’ to consolidate (and extend) its
political leadership in rural China—and in the country as a whole.41 
Democratic one-party rule in the PRC?
22 With the empirical data available so far, the following observations should be repeated
at first: The implementation of direct village elections has led to a horizontalisation of
power  relations  in  rural  China  and  more  political  awareness  of  the  peasants.
Consequently,  the  CP  is  forced  to  introduce  additional  institutional  reforms,  for
example  a  more  transparent  and  democratic  recruitment  of  local  Party  cadres—to
secure its leadership in the countryside. Also, it feels the pressure to introduce more
democratic elements at the next administrative level, i.e. the townships, in order to
pacify the ‘structural conflict’ between the local village committees and the township
governments. First steps in this direction have been taken by local Party branches in
different  provinces,  even  if  the  central  government  has  implicitly  declared  those
experiments illegal for the time being. The question of how much legitimacy the Party
has actually won by the cautious introduction of direct village and township elections is
still  very  much  underresearched.  However,  as  the  introduction  of  direct  village
elections has shown, there is reason for the Party leadership to be optimistic. In those
areas where elections have been fairly well implemented and practised over a longer
time and where the tension between ‘civilian’ and Party authority has been successfully
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mediated  by  more  intra-Party  democracy,  a  noticeable  rise  in  social  stability,
administrative efficiency and political legitimacy for the Party has been observed.
23 An  extension  of  township  elections  to  the  county  level  might  be  opportune  and
necessary for the CP some day. However, as to when this time will have come remains
open. As has been pointed out before, the CP has postponed long-discussed plans of
institutionalising a direct ballot at the township level for the time being, making it very
difficult to proceed with electoral reforms for those local authorities who are inclined
to do so. There are still other reasons, why direct county elections seem to be a long
way down the road: The fiscal position of the counties is much stronger than those of
the  townships,  making  them  more  independent  of  the  provinces  than  are  the
townships vis-à-vis the counties. This means that the counties are in a better position
to  withstand  the  political  pressure  from  below  in  case  of  conflicts  over  policy
implementation between the counties and their subordinates. First of all, the counties
are able to use their financial  resources and political  influence to ‘pacify’  township
leaders. Secondly, they will not instigate pressure from below by extracting too much
in fees  and taxes,  because  they  do  not  depend on the  financial  transfers  from the
townships to the same degree as the townships depend on the villages. Therefore the
counties could pass the buck back to the townships for a relatively long time—if only
elections at the township level are fair and the counties do not interfere too much in
township business.42 
24 Generally speaking, there is no reason to assume that the further perfection of village
elections and even the systematic introduction of direct township elections one day—
both under the roof of ongoing one-Party rule—would be considered manipulative and
undemocratic  by  the  rural  population.  On  the  contrary,  these  elections  have  been
considered quite democratic, even if they did not live up to Western standards calling
for the right of  organisational freedom and an institutionalised multi-party system.
There might be democratic legitimacy behind the wall of one-party rule. Such a ‘one-
party democracy’ is hardly imaginable in the West and would be flatly rejected by most
Western scholars as a practicable model to generate political legitimacy in the long or
even medium term. In China, however, institutional flexibility and adaptiveness of the
CP, the political economy of rural China (where political legitimacy is closely connected
to economic performance and the ‘wise’ distribution of assets to cadres and peasants),
even  specific  elements  of  political  culture  (preference  for  stability  and  order  over
participation) and the history of the PRC (giving the CP much credit for its role as an
anti-colonial  movement and symbol  of  national  unity)  make the idea of  democracy
under one-party rule an interesting point of discussion.43
25 The careful  rebuilding  of  the  political system of  the  PRC is  only  one  element  in  a
dynamic and comprehensive reform process which the CP has managed impressively
well over the last 25 years in terms of making its one-party rule compatible with the
requirements of modernisation and functional differentiation. Nobody would question
that the CP has suffered many ideological setbacks since the beginning of the reform
era. ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ does not reach the population at large, and
the  homogeneity  of  the  Party  has  become  cracked  by  regionalism,  widespread
corruption and various forms of local resistance against the cadre bureaucracy. But this
does not necessarily mean that the CP will soon fail to keep pace with the reforms that
it has initiated. More probably, the Party’s power monopoly might possibly be upheld
for a rather long time, just because it is ‘contained’—albeit in a quite limited way—by
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the  introduction  of  elements  of  competitive  democracy  in  the  political  process:
‘Limited’  or  ‘restricted’  democracy  generates  legitimacy,  because  it  is  more  than
nothing, but not too much. It might be just the right dose of democracy to balance the
people’s and the Party’s diverging interests in terms of participation and control. This
does not mean that the CP regime will never see the formation of a powerful opposition
some day  that  might  bring  about  a  democratic  transition  in  China.  Also,  a  regime
change from above, as in Taiwan, cannot be completely dismissed as a future option for
the  Communist  leadership.  Without  the  realisation  of  at  least  one  of  these  two
possibilities,  Chinese  democratisation  ‘Western-style’44 is  not  imaginable.  More
probable,  however,  is  the  long  duration  of  the  present  regime  which  has  to  be
investigated thoroughly with respect to its potential for institutional innovation and
flexibility  in  order  to  properly  understand  its  inherent  stability  and  political
(democratic)  legitimacy.  Therefore,  the  common  optimism  of  modernists  and
functionalists with their fixation on the nascent Chinese urban middle class as the most
important driving force of pluralisation and democratisation might blur the present
picture of political system reform in the PRC. Taking a close look at the developments
in the Chinese countryside is just as important.
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experiment was not repeated when new elections where due three years later. The
township head was once again chosen and elected by the local TPC (personal
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his strongest opponent, which makes his victory look much stronger than reported.
37.The most important reason for Tan’s victory was often said to be his access to more
plentiful financial resources to campaign and to more logistical support provided by
the township authorities. However, other authors have pointed out, that Tan was
finally more convincing to the voters by laying out a stringent strategy of economic
development promotion for the township and by bringing in his high-level contacts
established during his long time as a local politician. See Manion, Melanie, Chinese
Democratization in Perspective: Electorates and Selectorates at the Township Level, in:
The China Quarterly, No. 163, September 2000, pp. 764-782, here pp. 781-82; Li Fan,
Jiceng ganbu de xuanju ji qi yiyi. Sichuan Suiningshi Shizhong qu ganbu gongxuan de
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cadre election in Shizhong district of Suining city in Sichuan), in: Zhongguo shehui
daokan, No. 5, 1999 (www.ccrs.org); see also Liu, Yawei, Elections of Township/Town
Magistrates in Buyun, Dapeng and Linyi, 1998-1999, op.cit.
38.Li, Changping, Muji Buyun huanjie xuanju (Eyewitnessing the falling-due Buyun
election), in: Zhongguo gaige, No. 1, 2000, pp. 22-23; China and the World Institute,
Buyun xiang liangci xuanju de gaikuang, bijiao ji sikao (Reflection on, comparison and
brief account of the two elections in Buyun township), www.world-and-china.com/
03/0302091203.htm. 
39.However, these selectorates were at least partly composed of directly elected
villager representatives.
40.The Communist Party is also trying to reform the nomination process for candidates
of the local people’s congresses. According to the PRC constitution, congress members
at the township and county levels are directly elected by the eligible population.
However, the CP branches so far tightly control the nominations. Only recently, they
have started with experiments of more competitive screening procedures and choice
that pretty much resemble those described for elections of township governments in
this article. For details, see Manion, Chinese Democratization in Perspective:
Electorates and Selectorates at the Township Level, op.cit.
41.It is interesting to note at this point Melanie Manion’s (and other’s) verdict that the
1998 Buyun election was a complete failure for the party authorities, since their
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candidate, Tan Xiaoqiu, could hardly win against a non-party competitor. But why not
interpreting the results the other way round: As Tan survived the elections, victory has
made him a much stronger township head than anyone else who would have been put
in office by the former indirect ballot of the local people’s congress? As a matter of fact,
the Buyun ballot gave democratic legitimacy to a Communist cadre who would later
turn out to be a very efficient and responsible township head who could easily secure
re-election.
42.I admit that this line of argument is tentative at best, since research on the political
economy of township-county relations is very scant.
43.I fully realize that many readers will take issue with my definition of democracy. It
is certainly questionable to call a system of fair and competitive elections at the local
level under the accepted parameters of one-party rule democratic, even if naming it a
restricted democracy ‘Chinese style’. Also, I believe myself that organizational freedom
and a free press are core ingredients of any definition of democracy. However, much
depends on the people’s perception of what is democratic and what is not. In that
sense, there might be some justification for the Communist Party to speak of such a
thing, if only it has the support of the people (which is to test, though).
44.By ‘democratization Western-style’, I foremost mean a multi-party system at all
levels of government.
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